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Executive Summary
Auditors play an important role as gatekeepers to public capital markets. By attesting to
the accuracy of a company’s financial statements, the auditor lends its credibility to that
company and its financial health.
Both market and legal mechanisms play a role in ensuring that auditors perform high
quality audits. Reputation is critical in the market for auditors. In addition, potential
legal liability to issuers and investors arising from contract, tort, and statutory securities
laws creates incentives for auditors to conduct high quality audits. Potential discipline
by professional self-regulatory bodies also plays a part. Striking the appropriate balance
among market-based, legal, and self-regulatory mechanisms is a delicate task.
Canada and the US have both established oversight bodies for the auditors of public
companies in an effort to enhance the quality of audits for those companies: the Cana-
dian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) and the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board (PCAOB) in the United States. The two countries deviate, however, in their
allocation of regulatory responsibility in relation to the accounting profession, with Can-
ada continuing to rely on a largely self-regulatory model and the US relying almost exclu-
sively on government regulation.
This study compares these two approaches to the regulation of public auditors in Canada
and the US and offers concrete suggestions for improvement. In particular, this study
analyzes and compares the CPAB and the PCAOB, looking at the structure, operation,
and governance of the two boards, and analyzing their effectiveness and making recom-
mendations for how they might be improved.
Our central theme is that carefully circumscribed statutory authorization for the CPAB
could enhance its efficiency and effectiveness, without sacrificing the advantages of
self-regulation. In our view, statutory authority for the CPAB would enhance its legiti-
macy. Properly circumscribed statutory authorization would also provide the CPAB with
powers that are normally granted to governmental regulators, such as immunity and
subpoena powers, without undermining the virtues of self-regulation: adaptability and
responsiveness to current conditions.
We also recommend greater independence for the CPAB. The CPAB is less independent
than PCAOB, which could result in actual or perceived conflicts of interest that could be
detrimental to the integrity of the institution and more generally to investor confidence
in the capital markets. In particular, the CPAB governance structure gives significant
influence to the accounting industry. To enhance the independence of the CPAB from
the accounting profession, the voting rights of Industry Members (who are all from the
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accounting profession) should be removed and the number of accountants on the board
of directors should be reduced. Neither of these reforms would eliminate valuable input
from the accounting industry, but they would help alleviate concerns that self-regulation
was being administered in the interests of the accounting industry at the expense of the
interests of investors.
The independence of the CPAB is also called into question by the fact that many mem-
bers of the CPAB board of directors also fill influential roles in public companies that are
themselves subject to public audits. A reasonable argument could be made that these are
activities that affect or reasonably create the appearance of affecting the board member’s
independence or objectivity. Combining the predominance of accounting industry repre-
sentatives on CPAB with public company executives raises doubt about the rigor that the
CPAB will bring to accounting regulation. As such, consideration should be given to
heightening the independence requirements for the CPAB board of directors.
The funding source and structure of CPAB are also a concern. CPAB is funded directly by
accounting firms whereas PCAOB is funded by public companies. Consideration should
be given to changing the funding structure so that accounting firms do not directly con-
trol the financial viability of the CPAB and also to avoid any perceived conflict. This
would require legislation to provide the CPAB with a more secure source of funding.
Whether the funds continue to come from the accounting profession directly or instead
from public companies is less important than ensuring that the funding is guaranteed.
A more secure source of funding might allow the CPAB to expand the scope of its inspec-
tions to cover all firms auditing public companies. Under the current regime, provincial
self-regulatory bodies conduct inspections of small companies, raising questions about
the consistency of inspections.
In respect of enforcement, the CPAB’s effectiveness would be enhanced by statutory pro-
tection providing immunity for staff, which would allow them to pursue the board’s
mandate without fear of retaliatory litigation. In addition, the deterrent force of sanc-
tions available to the CPAB would be enhanced if it were provided with statutory author-
ity to impose fines on accounting professionals who choose to abandon the auditing of
public companies rather than pay fines imposed by the CPAB. At this point, both
PCAOB and CPAB have limited track records of sanctioning firms; any further recom-
mendations for enforcement policy must await longer history in order to evaluate the
two boards’ relative performance in enforcing their rules.
Finally, by making their activities more transparent to the public, the accountability of
both the CPAB and PCAOB should be enhanced. The boards need to be able to dissemi-
nate their findings candidly and promptly, so that market participants can weigh those
findings in their assessments of audit quality. This recommendation must be tempered
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against the litigation risk faced by inspected audit firms, so we also recommend making
the reports inadmissible in court. Litigation concerns should not dilute the informa-
tional value provided by the PCAOB and CPAB reports.
Summary of Recommendations
Recommendation 1: CPAB should be provided with statutory authority to enhance its
legitimacy. Properly circumscribed statutory authorization would provide the CPAB
with powers that are normally granted to governmental regulators, without undermin-
ing the virtues of self-regulation: adaptability and responsiveness to current conditions.
Recommendation 2: To enhance the independence of the CPAB from the accounting
profession, consideration should be given to revising the governance structure of the
CPAB such that industry members do not have voting rights. Consideration should also
be given to limiting the number of accountants on the board of directors. Proportionate
representation from the CGAs and CMAs as industry members also warrants further
consideration.
Recommendation 3: Consideration should be given to heightening the independence
requirements for CPAB directors, many of whom fill influential roles in public compa-
nies that are themselves subject to public audits.
Recommendation 4: Consideration should be given to amending the structure and
source of CPAB’s fees so as to minimize the direct influence of accounting firms that are
inspected by the board as well as to ensure a stable and guaranteed funding stream.
Recommendation 5: CPAB should consider undertaking inspections of smaller partici-
pating firms which are currently inspected by provincial self-regulatory bodies. Other-
wise, it may be subject to criticism that it is not truly living up to its mandate of
providing independent inspections of all accounting firms that audit public companies.
Recommendation 6: CPAB’s enforcement effectiveness would be enhanced by statu-
tory protection providing immunity for its staff. Such immunity would allow them to
pursue the board’s mandate without fear of retaliation. In addition, the deterrent force of
sanctions available to the CPAB would be enhanced if it were provided with the statutory
authority to impose fines on accounting professionals who chose to abandon the audit-
ing of public companies rather than pay fines imposed by the CPAB. Both PCAOB and
CPAB have limited track records of sanctioning firms, so we recommend that their rela-
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tive performance in enforcing their rules be evaluated at a later point when they both
have longer track records.
Recommendation 7: The activities of the CPAB and PCAOB should be made more
transparent to the public to enhance their accountability. This recommendation must be
tempered against the litigation risk faced by inspected audit firms, so we also recom-
mend making the reports inadmissible in court.
I. Introduction: How Do We Ensure High Quality Audits?
Auditors play an important role as gatekeepers to public capital markets. The auditors’
job is to promote investor confidence, i.e., auditors are in the integrity business. Essen-
tially, auditors earn their living by renting their reputation (Puri and Ben-Ishai, 2004, pp.
127-130). By attesting to the accuracy of a company’s financial statements (more pre-
cisely, that the company’s financial statements conform to generally accepted account-
ing principles), the auditor lends its credibility to that company.
The certification of a company’s financial reports that an accounting firm provides is
only as good as the accounting firm’s reputation for doing a thorough audit unhampered
by conflict of interest.1 An auditor’s reputation is built upon the quality of the audits that
it performs, so basic economic theory tells us that an auditing firm should have the
incentive to refine its audit methodologies until the marginal increase in the cost of the
audit equals the marginal benefit conferred on the client company. That marginal benefit
takes the form of enhanced credibility for the client company’s financial statements with
a correspondingly lower cost of capital and better terms in other contractual relation-
ships.
Although market-based reputation arguments have a role to play in enhancing the qual-
ity of audits, other mechanisms also push accounting firms to provide high quality
audits: contractual liability to the public companies, potential tort liability to investors
and other stakeholders, statutory liability under securities laws, as well as oversight and
discipline by professional self-regulatory bodies.
The quality of the accountant’s audit may not be readily apparent to the intended audi-
ence for the auditor’s attestation, i.e., creditors, suppliers, customers, and most of all,
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1 Fung and Gul (2005) provide evidence that firms that provide higher quality audits are able to
charge higher fees.
investors. Evaluating the quality of audit services is a difficult task, requiring highly-spe-
cialized expertise and access to an accounting firm’s work records.
For this reason, the ex post revelation of an audit failure can send a very ambiguous sig-
nal. Were the auditors complacent, or were they duped by a concerted effort among the
insiders? Short of a full-blown forensic audit (an expensive proposition), insiders will be
able to sneak some percentage of deceptions past their auditors even when the auditors
have done their job properly. We should not leap from the fact of fraud in a financial
statement to the conclusion that the auditors were asleep at the switch. Indeed, one
study comparing Arthur Andersen’s performance relative to its peers finds no significant
differences (Eisenberg and Macey, 2004, p. 263). And Deloitte & Touche, which con-
ducted the audit quality peer review of Arthur Andersen just prior to Andersen’s implo-
sion, found that Andersen’s systems were adequate to provide reasonable assurance that
its audits complied with professional standards (Chaney and Philipich, 2002, pp.
1221-1223, discussing the Deloitte & Touche report of its peer review).
Notwithstanding the messiness of the signal conveyed by an audit failure, publicity
regarding auditing problems can have severe consequences in addition to the loss of rep-
utation. Most prominent among these consequences, at least in the US and increasingly
so in Canada, is the risk of a securities fraud class action, with potentially ruinous dam-
ages. Auditors also face a risk of litigation from their corporate clients and those com-
pany’s creditors.
Auditing firms therefore have two strong incentives to perform thorough audits: to
maintain and enhance their reputations; and to reduce their litigation risk. These incen-
tives must be balanced, of course, against competitive pressures to keep the costs of
audits down, which necessarily stand in opposition to maximizing audit quality. The
question is whether the reputation and litigation incentives are sufficient to maintain
acceptable audit quality.
There are reasons to question the efficacy of both reputation and litigation. As discussed
above, both incentives are far from precise in practice, which undermines their deterrent
force. In addition, both operate only retrospectively, after the audit failed to uncover the
fraud. The risk of litigation, in particular, may undermine the incentive of audit firms to
discipline their partners. As George Benston explains:
Should the firms fire or otherwise punish a partner for having supervised
and approved an incompetent or inadequate audit or for having agreed too
readily to a client’s demands, the firm would be admitting its collective
guilt to regulators and present, or potential, plaintiffs. (Benston, 2003,
p. 1345)
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Worse still, the threat of litigation has potentially perverse consequences for users of
financial statements. To stave off litigation, auditing firms push for more and more
detailed rules, so that they can defend themselves against charges of a negligent audit by
demonstrating that the financial statements were prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles. (More detailed standards also bolster the auditor’s will-
ingness to resist pressure from the client to fudge the numbers—if the rules are clear, no
independent auditor is likely to sign off on their violation, so “shopping” for a more com-
pliant auditor is pointless.) The problem is that as accounting principles become more
detailed, financial statements may become so complex that they are rendered opaque to
even the informed user, much less the average investor. The bottom line is that we
would like to be able to evaluate the quality of an audit firm’s work in a more nuanced
way than the assessment afforded by reputation and litigation.
Regulation may offer additional insight into audit quality, in addition to establishing a
minimum floor below which audit quality will not be permitted to go. Canada and the
US have both established oversight bodies for the auditors of public companies in an
effort to enhance the quality of audits for those companies: the Canadian Public
Accountability Board (CPAB) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) in the US. The two countries deviate, however, in their allocation of regulatory
responsibility, with Canada relying on a largely self-regulatory model and the US relying
almost exclusively on government regulation.
The purpose of this study is to compare those two approaches to the regulation of public
auditors and offer concrete suggestions for improvement. We proceed as follows. Part II
canvasses the theoretical debate on self-regulation versus the traditional governmental
model in the context of the regulation of auditors. Parts III and IV outline the regulation
of auditing in the US and Canada. Part V then analyzes and compares the PCAOB and
CPAB, looking at the structure of the two boards, examining their operation and gover-
nance, analyzing their effectiveness, and making recommendations for how they might
be improved. Our central theme is that carefully circumscribed statutory authorization
for the CPAB could enhance its efficiency and effectiveness, without sacrificing the
advantages of self-regulation. Part VI concludes with a brief summary of our findings
and recommendations.
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II. Self-regulation and Government Regulation
Regulation of auditing
Does regulation have a role to play in ensuring audit quality? The need for specialized
expertise and access to the auditor’s work papers suggests that it might. An expert in
accounting with such access might provide a more precise evaluation of the quality of an
auditor’s work than the signal provided by an audit failure. An audit firm with confi-
dence in its procedures and employees might be willing to commit itself to a review
regime with sanctions, if the review were conducted and the sanctions determined by an
expert. Under such a regime, audit firms would be confident that sanctions would only
be imposed when it had done an inadequate job. And auditors would presumably wel-
come ex ante advice on their audit methods if it helped them avoid the damaging loss of
reputation and costly lawsuits provoked by an audit failure. This analysis suggests that
there may be two useful roles for regulation. The first is looking at the outcome of a par-
ticular audit engagement in hindsight. The second is looking at an audit firm’s proce-
dures more generally to determine if those procedures are likely to produce a credible
attestation of the company’s financial statement. Oversight boards such as PCAOB and
CPAB may have an important role to play in these tasks.
Self-regulation
Recognizing that there may be a role for regulation does not answer the question of who
should do the regulating. The customary answer is that the government should regulate.
The long-standing tradition in the field of accounting, however, has been self-regulation.
Professional trade associations for accountants have developed standards for audits,
conducted inspections in Canada, adopted systems of “peer review” for their members in
the US, and imposed sanctions on auditors who fell short of professional standards.
Benefits of self-regulation
Self-regulation offers a number of advantages, expertise foremost among them.
Accounting is a technical field, and its rules and standards are difficult for the layman to
grasp. Accountants are also more likely to be attuned to the subtleties of the relationship
between auditor and client and how things are likely to go awry in that relationship.
Critically, a fellow accountant is more likely to be able to assess whether the auditor has
been duped by its client despite the auditor’s best efforts, or the auditor’s independence
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has been compromised because one or more of its employees have fallen under the sway
of a valuable client.
Related to expertise is the notion that self-regulation may be more responsive to devel-
opments in the field. One of the most difficult challenges facing an accounting regulator
is the need to keep abreast of changes in many diverse businesses, as well as the develop-
ment of entire new industries, both of which may pose problems for existing auditing
standards. A practitioner may have an advantage in staying on top of such developments.
Another advantage of self-regulation is that it imposes the cost of financing regulation
on members of the regulated industry. The premise of regulating auditors is that it
makes the service provided by auditors more valuable, which should increase the
demand for those services. Self-regulation forces auditors to internalize the cost of regu-
lation from which they benefit by being able to charge higher fees.
Costs of self-regulation
Self-financing of regulation raises the concern that an industry that regulates itself may
be tempted to skimp on regulation if it produces benefits primarily for third parties. In
the accounting context, regulation that produces reliable audits may aid competitors of
an auditors’ client if the audited financial statements allow competitors to determine the
most profitable components of a company’s business or better evaluate the company’s
cost structure. Clients will not be anxious to bear the expense of tipping their hands to
their competitors.
Self-financing can also be wielded as a threat if the self-regulator deviates too far from
the preferences of the regulated industry. In the US, accounting firms badly undermined
the credibility of self-regulation by threatening to withdraw funding for self-regulation
because of a dispute over auditor independence. This bullying greatly undermined the
argument that the accounting industry’s self-regulator was independent and could
therefore be trusted to regulate in the interest of investors.2
A less frequently voiced concern is that regulation can be a way of cartelizing an industry.
There is some evidence that the regulation of auditing has created substantial barriers to
entry in the auditing of public companies, with the field being dominated by the Big Four
accounting firms. In the same vein, regulation can be a means for agreeing on gold-plated
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2 As Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), puts it, “The
lesson of this episode is crystal clear: self-regulation by the accounting profession is a bad joke…
The firms would never subject themselves to scrutiny unless forced to do so” (Levitt, 2002, p. 127).
auditing standards that exceed the auditing intensity that would be demanded by the
marginal company. Regulation can compel companies with relatively straightforward
businesses that are easily evaluated by investors to buy more rigorous audits than they,
or their investors, need. Thus, auditing standards can be a means of artificially increasing
the demand for auditing services.
Another concern sometimes raised with self-regulation is that accountants might be
unwilling to sanction their peers who failed to adhere to industry standards because it
would create bad publicity for the industry as a whole. This criticism has a certain intu-
itive appeal, but it likely underestimates the ability of sophisticated institutional investors
to distinguish quality differences among auditors. There are a finite number of “brand
name” auditors from which public companies can choose. Market analysts and other
investors have some sense of which auditing firms have the greatest expertise in a particu-
lar industry. Informed investors, at least, would avoid the error of assessing collective
blame on the auditing industry for the shortcomings of one member of that industry.
A practical concern with self-regulation is that the self-regulator may lack the power to
obtain information from third parties. Because their disciplinary power arises from a
member firm’s consent to be disciplined, a self-regulator can coerce the consent of the
member to cooperate with an investigation by threatening expulsion, but the self-regula-
tor has no comparable threat to wield against non-members. A complete and thorough
investigation, however, may require cooperation from third parties, such as the clients of
the member firms. But the clients may have good reasons not to cooperate, such as litiga-
tion risk. There is unlikely to be a problem with an audit if there is not an underlying
problem with the client corporation’s accounting, and the corporation faces substan-
tially greater litigation exposure than the auditors.
Government regulation
The need for government regulation is typically invoked when a self-regulating industry
is not regulating “enough.” Determining how much regulation is “enough,” much less
what form of regulation is likely to be most effective, is a daunting task. As well, politi-
cians are not inclined to be interested in the regulation of accounting. The topic seems
rather dry and unapproachable until an accounting scandal creates public demand for
heightened regulation by way of legislation. Politicians will want to “do something” in
response to accounting scandals, even if the proposed “something” may prove to be
unnecessary, ineffective, or even counter-productive.
Government regulation also poses the risk that well-organized interest groups may exert
undue influence over policy makers. Critics of self-regulation commonly complain that
market participants may be lax in regulation because of the need to respond to client
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pressure. Compared to what? The forces demanding less stringent regulation of auditors
will demand the same from government. Governments respond to those groups because
they are well organized, well financed, and have a strong interest in lobbying politicians.
Government regulation should not be confused with the absence of self-interested
policymaking.
Government regulation also raises the opposite concern: that members of the regulated
industry will lobby the government to set the quality standard higher than economic effi-
ciency would dictate. As noted above, self-regulation also poses this risk, but govern-
ment enforcement of the cartel may be substantially more effective. High standards may
be an effective barrier excluding new entrants from the market, thereby allowing incum-
bent firms to charge supra-competitive rates.
III. Accounting Regulation in the United States
Regulation of accounting and auditing in the US prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Until 1933 in the United States, the contents of financial statements included in public
companies’ prospectuses and annual reports were regulated only by some state laws and
listing agreements from exchanges (Benston, 2003, p. 1325). With the adoption of the
federal securities laws in 1933 and 1934, auditing of public companies in the United
States was placed under the supervision of the SEC.3 The SEC has generally used that
authority sparingly until recently, choosing instead to delegate to the accounting profes-
sion the formulation of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) (Seligman, 1985).
In practice that meant delegation of the promulgation of auditing standards to the
accounting industry’s trade association, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA), and its predecessors.4
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3 Securities Act of 1933, § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1933). The accounting authority now held by
the SEC was held briefly by the Federal Trade Commission until the SEC was created by the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 4(a), 210, 15 U.S.C. 78d(a)
(1934) (creating SEC as an independent commission and vesting it with authority previously held
by the Federal Trade Commission under the Securities Act of 1933). The Exchange Act also autho-
rizes the SEC to require audited financial statements in public company’s periodic filings. Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(b)(1)(J) & (K), § 13(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b) & § 78m(a)(2).
4 The SEC has also delegated the formulation of accounting principles to the accounting industry.
The AICPA eventually delegated the promulgation of generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), a part of the non-profit Financial
Accounting Foundation (FAF) (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2005).
The AICPA delegated the promulgation of auditing standards to what eventually became
the Auditing Standards Board (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
2002). The Auditing Standards Board was originally overseen directly by the AICPA, but
oversight was briefly shifted in 2001 to the Public Oversight Board (POB), an independ-
ent entity that was funded by the AICPA (Nagy, 2005). The POB was created in 1977 to
administer a self-regulatory system for auditors, in part to head off the threat of govern-
ment regulation of the accounting industry.5
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
Self-regulation of the accounting industry increasingly came in for criticism. These con-
cerns came to a head in 2002 in the wake of a number of high-profile accounting scan-
dals, highlighted by the Enron meltdown. The number of accounting problems relative
to the number of US public companies was small, to be sure, but the prominence of the
Enron fiasco suggested to at least some observers that US public companies had a perva-
sive audit failure problem. After the implosion of WorldCom amidst a particularly
bald-faced accounting fraud, Congress rushed to get tough on accountants with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act created a new quasi-governmental regula-
tor for auditors of public companies, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB or Board).
A non-profit corporation, the PCAOB is charged with: “protect[ing] the interests of
investors and further[ing] the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate,
and independent audit reports” for public companies (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101(c), 15
U.S.C. § 7211(c)). In furtherance of these goals, Congress assigned the PCAOB four
principal tasks:
1. registering public accounting firms;
2. establishing “auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards
relating to the preparation of audit reports” for public companies;
3. conducting inspections of registered accounting firms;
4. investigating and disciplining registered accounting firms and persons associated
with those firms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101(c), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c)).
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5 Securities and Exchange Commission (2002), p. 12. (Hereinafter, SEC, Framework.) The Public
Oversight Board disbanded in early 2002 after the SEC announced its intention to create a new
oversight body for the accounting profession (Nagy, 2005, p. 995).
In sum, Congress assigned to the PCAOB the comprehensive regulation of the account-
ing industry, at least the sector of that industry that audits public companies. Account-
ing firms auditing public companies are all required to register with the PCAOB
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 7212). Once registered, the accounting firms are
subject to the auditing, quality control, and ethics standards adopted by the PCAOB
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 7213). To ensure that registered firms are fol-
lowing its standards, the PCAOB is charged with conducting periodic inspections of reg-
istered accounting firms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 104(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(a)). The board
is also empowered to investigate possible violations by registered accounting firms of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the securities laws, and the PCAOB’s own rules
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 105(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(1)).
The PCAOB performs these functions under the close oversight of the SEC. Congress
followed the existing statutory framework for self-regulatory organizations (SROs),
making it explicit that the PCAOB would be subject to the SEC’s direction and control.6
Thus, despite the PCAOB’s nominal status as a non-profit corporation, it is effectively an
arm of the government.
VI. Accounting Regulation in Canada
Accounting and auditing in Canada prior to recent reforms
Canadian corporate law statutes and provincial securities legislation require audited
financial statements by independent auditors, but do not directly regulate auditors.
These statutes generally defer to the relevant self-regulatory bodies on standards of
accounting and auditing, as well as independence rules.
In Canada, chartered accountants (“CAs”) have been regulated almost exclusively
through their self-regulatory bodies: the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
(CICA) and the provincial self-regulatory bodies for chartered accountants (“the provin-
cial institutes”). Various committees of the CICA promulgate accounting standards,
auditing and assurance standards, and independence standards. The provincial insti-
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6 The most important of the SROs in the United States are the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and the National Association of Securities Dealers. Membership in an SRO—with its attendant
membership obligations—is a prerequisite for trading as a broker or a dealer in the US (Exchange
Act § 15(a)(1)), so virtually all brokerage houses belong to either the NYSE or the NASD and many
belong to both.
tutes have historically been responsible for enforcing the rules and standards and also
for periodically inspecting accounting firms.
Auditing and assurance standards are set by the Auditing and Assurance Standards
Board (AASB) of the CICA. 7 Generally Accepted Assurance Standards (GAAS) govern
the conduct of independent audits by CAs in Canada (Smith, Caron, and Hunt, 2002, pp.
2-3). The voting members of the AASB are staffed entirely by accountants working in
various accounting firms and in industry (see http://www.cica.ca/index.cfm/ci_id/19621/
la_id/1.htm). The AASB is subject to the oversight of the Auditing and Assurance Stan-
dards Oversight Council (AASOC)—an independent body established in October 2002
by the CICA to oversee the activities of Canada’s Chartered Accountants. AASOC con-
sists of prominent leaders from business and regulators and is responsible for reporting
to the public, appointing AASB members and ensuring the standard setting process is
responsive to the public interest (see http://www.cica.ca/index.cfm/ ci_id/204/la_id/1.htm).
Finally, standards of practice and ethics standards for accountants, including independ-
ence rules, are set by the CICA. Those standards are then adopted and enforced by the
provincial accounting self-regulatory bodies across the country (Smith, Caron, and
Hunt, 2002, pp. 2-3).
Certified General Accountants (“CGAs”) and Certified Management Accountants
(“CMAs”), two other categories of professional accountants in Canada, are also regu-
lated by their respective self-regulatory bodies (see http://www.cga-online.org/servlet/cus-
tom/publicView?region=ca and http://www.cma-canada.org/index.cfm/ci_id/45/la_id/1.htm).
Until recently, only CAs were permitted to perform public audits in Canada, but some
provinces have recently passed legislation allowing CGAs and CMAs to engage in public
accounting if appropriately qualified.8
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7 In a model similar to that used in the US, GAAP, the authoritative standards for financial account-
ing and reporting are set by the Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) of the CICA. The Accounting
Standards Oversight Board (AcSOC) provides public oversight of the AcSB. The AcSOC is an inde-
pendent body that was established in September 2000 by the CICA to oversee the activities of the
AcSB (Smith, Caron, and Hunt, 2002, pp. 2-3).
8 See, for example, Public Accounting Act, 2004 (Ontario) which was proclaimed into force Novem-
ber 2005. The Act creates a new “Public Accountants Council” (PAC), which is to oversee a public
accounting standard for Ontario benchmarked against existing standards for public accounting.
Under the Act, CMAs and CGAs would be eligible to obtain a public accounting licence if their
SROs demonstrate to PAC that they meet the existing standards for public accounting.
Canadian response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Canadian Public Accountability Board
In response to the corporate governance scandals noted above and the swift passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US in the summer of 2002, Canadian regulators also faced
the task of how to respond to maintain investor confidence in the Canadian capital mar-
kets.9 Canadian securities authorities worked to elevate corporate governance, as well as
financial reporting rules and practices, by introducing rules on audit committees and
CEO/CFO certification, for example.10 The CICA adopted new requirements for auditor
independence, reflecting updated global standards. The federal government also indi-
cated its willingness to use the criminal law to address corporate misconduct by creating
Integrated Market Enforcement Teams (IMETs) and by passing Bill C-13 (Government
of Canada, 2004). The goal of these reforms was to signal to investors at home and inter-
nationally that Canada is a safe place to invest in the capital markets.
Various initiatives were also announced and introduced with respect to financial
accounting and reporting. In the summer of 2002, it was announced that the Canadian
Public Accountability Board (CPAB) would be created to oversee accounting firms that
audit Canadian public companies. The CPAB’s mandate is to promote high quality, inde-
pendent auditing, thereby contributing to public confidence in the integrity of financial
reporting (CPAB Rule 101). The CPAB oversees auditors of Canadian public companies
through an inspection program to ensure high quality and independent audit processes.
National Instrument 52-108 requires that public accounting firms that participate in the
CPAB’s inspection program audit the financial statements of reporting issuers.
The structural changes in the regulation of accounting and auditing resulting from the
creation of the CPAB appear to be less drastic than in the US. Most notably, the CPAB is
not subject to direct oversight by a government agency, as the PCAOB is subject to over-
sight by the SEC. The CPAB’s mandate and scope of inspections are also narrower than
its US counterpart. Unlike the PCAOB, the CPAB has not been assigned the task of over-
seeing and regulating the entire accounting industry. Most importantly, the CPAB does
not set auditing standards as the PCAOB does; this function remains the purview of the
relevant accounting self-regulatory bodies. In practice, the CPAB also does not oversee
all accounting firms that audit public companies, leaving the inspection of smaller audit-
ing firms to the provincial institutes. Thus, the CPAB adheres much more to a self-regu-
latory model than does the PCAOB.
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9 See http://www.fin.gc.ca/toce/2003/fostering_e.html#ANNEX for a summary of legislative changes.
10 See, for example, Multilateral Instrument 52-110 Audit Committees and Companion Policy; see
also, Multilateral Instrument 52-109 Certification of Disclosure in Issuers’ Annual and Interim Fil-
ings and Companion Policy; see also National Instrument 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Gover-
nance Practices and National Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance Guidelines.
V. Analysis and assessment of PCAOB and CPAB
Statutory authority
Recommendation 1
CPAB should be provided with statutory authority to enhance its legitimacy.
Properly circumscribed statutory authorization would provide the CPAB with
powers that are normally granted to governmental regulators, without undermin-
ing the virtues of self-regulation: adaptability and responsiveness to current con-
ditions.
As discussed in Part III, the PCAOB is established pursuant to, and its duties dictated by,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101, 15 U.S.C § 7211). In contrast, pro-
vincial securities commissions, the Federal Superintendent of Financial Institutions, and
the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants jointly created the CPAB (CICA)
through a memorandum of understanding (CPAB 2003 Annual Report, p. 1). The CPAB
then enters into contractual agreements with participating audit firms empowering the
CPAB to oversee them (CPAB 2003 Annual Report, p. 5). The duties of the CPAB are
found in its own rules and in its bylaws. Effectively, the CPAB defines its own scope of
responsibility, subject to the acquiescence of the bodies that created it.
One could argue that the PCAOB may lack the flexibility and responsiveness to meet
changing circumstances. The PCAOB’s structure and regulatory system are largely
ensconced within a statutory framework that can only be amended by Congress. Given
Congress’s indifference to capital market reform unless a financial crisis has captured
the headlines, a legislative fix may be slow in coming. Indeed, allowing Congress to
deflect responsibility for regulatory failures was undoubtedly a principal motive for
establishing the PCAOB as a nominally “private” regulator.11
As the CPAB has broad powers to create or amend its own rules, the CPAB has great flex-
ibility in adjusting its duties in order to meet current challenges. This flexibility, how-
ever, may create the appearance of uncertainty in the board’s mandate. The CPAB can
also be criticized as not having the same legitimacy as the PCAOB because it is not a
creature of statute or legislative action.12 That lack of statutory authority may also raise
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11 Nagy, 2005, p. 1061 (arguing that “the pursuit of policy through a public/private regulator signifi-
cantly lessens Congress’s and the President’s accountability to the public because it obscures
responsibility for unpopular decisions or unwise policies”).
12 The Certified General Accountants of Ontario (CGAO) has questioned CPAB’s institutional legiti-
macy because the board lacks legislative authority and oversight (Buckstein, 2005, p. 23). Similarly,
concerns about the possibility of arbitrary actions unchecked by fair administrative pro-
cedure.
The CPAB’s position is that its lack of statutory authorization is a by-product of Can-
ada’s constitutional structure, which precludes an auditor oversight agency from being
created by federal legislation (CPAB, 2003, p. 4). The CPAB’s lack of statutory authority
is certainly related to Canada’s current fragmented system of provincial securities regu-
lation, but it is by no means a forgone conclusion that Canada’s constitutional structure
precludes the federal legislature from creating an auditor oversight agency.13 A federal
securities regulator would allow for easier statutory creation of national organizations
such as CPAB, but provincial legislatures could also pass legislation to allow CPAB to
have the necessary and appropriate authority. In the US, entities such as the PCAOB and
NASD function within the statutory framework created for the SEC and are therefore
more directly controllable by Congress.
Aside from the legitimacy issue, the lack of a statutory foundation for CPAB creates
more practical problems. As a creature of contract, the CPAB lacks the powers and
protections that are normally provided to government regulators (CPAB, 2004, p. 3).
The board may be denied access to confidential information about reporting issuers that
may be in working papers of auditors, and member firms may claim legal privilege in
respect of private communications between auditors and their reporting issuer clients
(CPAB, 2004, p. 3).14 In addition, the CPAB and its directors, officers, and staff are not
protected for actions taken in good faith in carrying out the CPAB’s mandate (CPAB,
2004, p. 3), which is a concern that has been highlighted by the board in its most recent
annual report. These concerns should be addressed immediately by providing the CPAB
with access to needed documentary evidence and appropriate immunity.
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New York Congressmen John Sweeney claimed the CPAB is not an appropriate partner for a reci-
procity agreement because it lacks, among other things, direct statutory authority (Buckstein,
2005, p. 23). Even David Scott, the CPAB’s current CEO believes that it would be preferable for the
CPAB to be enshrined in law (Buckstein, 2005, p. 23).
13 In fact, Canada has recently engaged in a vigorous debate on the optimal regulatory structure for
the securities industry in Canada. Legal opinions suggest that the federal government could legis-
late in the securities field (Wise Persons Committee, 2003). See also constitutional opinions pre-
pared for the Wise Persons Committee at http://www.wise-averties.ca/report_en.html.
14 See also International Accounting, 2004, in which it is noted that CPAB inspectors “were unable to
examine certain client engagement files as these were subject to legal privilege.”
Governance structure, oversight and accountability
Recommendation 2
To enhance the independence of the CPAB from the accounting profession, con-
sideration should be given to revising the governance structure of the CPAB such
that industry members do not have voting rights. Consideration should also be
given to limiting the number of accountants on the board of directors. Proportion-
ate representation from the CGAs and CMAs as industry members also warrants
further consideration.
The PCAOB is comprised of five members, one of whom is the chairperson
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 72111(e)(1)). The influence of the
accounting profession over the PCAOB is limited by the stricture that “[t]wo members,
and only 2 members, of the board shall be or have been certified public accountants ...”
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(2)). A certified public accountant
may only act as chairperson if he or she has not practiced for at least five years prior to his
or her current appointment to the board (Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
72111(e)(2)). The SEC appoints board members after consultation with the board of
governors of the Federal Reserve System and the secretary of the treasury
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(e)(4)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 72111(e)(4)(A)). Board members serve
staggered five-year terms.15
Although Congress ensured that the PCAOB would be independent of the accounting
profession, the board is plainly subservient to the SEC. The PCAOB is required to make
an annual report of its activities to the SEC and to Congress (Sarbanes-Oxley Act §
101(h); 15 U.S.C. § 7211(h)). Although the PCAOB is not directly answerable to Con-
gress, the SEC is. If Congressmen have complaints about the PCAOB’s functioning, they
can be addressed to the SEC, which is highly responsive to Congress (see generally Prit-
chard, 2005, p. 1073).
In addition to appointing the PCAOB’s members, the SEC has extensive oversight
authority over the board analogous to that exercised by the Commission over the SROs
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 107(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7217(a)).16 The SEC can review disciplinary
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15 They are, however, subject to removal by the SEC “for good cause shown” (Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
§ 101(e)(5) & (6), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(5) & (6)).
16 Despite the practical necessity of belonging to an SRO, the SROs maintain the veneer of being “vol-
untary” “self-regulatory” organizations. The SROs are “voluntary” only in the sense that a firm
could choose to go out of business rather than become a member. And they are self-regulatory in
the sense that they are free to devise rules for their membership and enforce those rules as they see
fit—as long as the SEC agrees with those rules and the SROs’ enforcement policies. Not only does
the SEC have the final authority to approve SRO rules, it can amend directly the rules of the SROs
actions taken by the board, either at the behest of an aggrieved party (i.e., an accounting
firm or an accountant) or on the SEC’s own motion (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 107(c)(2), 15
U.S.C. § 7217(c)(2)). The SEC can not only overturn disciplinary proceedings if they are
not conducted in accordance with law, it can also review the sanctions imposed by the
board and reduce, modify, or increase the sanction (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 107(c)(3), 15
U.S.C. § 7217(c)(3)). Moreover, the SEC can censure the board itself, or rescind its
authority, if the SEC is not satisfied with how the board does its job (Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, § 107(d), 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)). In addition to SEC oversight, the PCAOB has cre-
ated its own system of internal monitoring, called Internal Oversight and Performance
Assurance (IOPA).17
The SEC must approve all rules proposed by the PCAOB (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, §
107(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7217(b)(2)). More intrusively, the SEC can amend any PCAOB
rule (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 107(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 7217(b)(5)). The PCAOB seeks com-
ment of its proposed rules by posting them on a rulemaking docket (“How to Comment
on Board Rulemaking” from PCAOB web site, http://www.pcaobus.org/rules/rulemaking_
docket.aspx). The board has also convened a Standing Advisory Group (SAG) for this pur-
pose composed of approximately 30 people representing the auditing profession, public
companies, investors, and others, and has granted four organizations (the FASB, the
Government Accountability Office, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards
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and it can sanction the SROs if they are not enforcing their rules as vigorously as the SEC would
like (Exchange Act § 19). If the SEC thinks that new rules are needed, the SROs promulgate new
rules for the SEC’s approval.
17 The IOPA provides internal examination of the programs and operations of the PCAOB for the pur-
pose of ensuring the efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity of all PCAOB activities. The PCAOB
web site contains the IOPA Charter in “Mission and Scope of Work” (see http://www.pcaobus.org/
Internal_Oversight/Charter.pdf). Specifically, IOPA conducts annual and special reviews and inqui-
ries to help ensure that the PCAOB is aware of and properly addressing any risks to the integrity
and effectiveness of its operations, that the PCAOB consistently seeks to improve the effectiveness
or efficiency of its operations, that its reports are conducted in a fair, complete, reliable, and timely
manner, that it complies with applicable laws, regulations, and policies, and encourages and
enforces such compliance by PCAOB employees, that its resources are used efficiently and pro-
tected from improper uses, that the PCAOB conducts itself in a manner that protects and promotes
the public interest in the integrity of audits. The main mechanism for meeting these goals is reports
issued by the IOPA pursuant to their reviews, which often will include recommendations to
enhance board operations. The IOPA Charter provides that the IOPA should be “free in fact and
appearance from personal, external, and organizational impairments to independence.” In order to
promote the objectivity of the IOPA, the director reports directly to the governing board, which has
the exclusive authority to hire, fire, and establish the compensation and other terms of employ-
ment of the director. The IOPA has unrestricted access to the records, offices, and employees of the
board. Outside stakeholders or interested parties are able to provide information relating to a
PCAOB employee by directly contacting the IOPA (PCAOB web site, http://www.pcaobus.org/Inter-
nal_Oversight/index.asp.
Board, and the SEC) observer status with speaking rights at all meetings of the SAG
(“Standard Setting” from PCAOB web site, http://www.pcaobus.org/Standards/Standards_
Setting.asp).
The CPAB’s governance structure is somewhat more complicated. It is divided into the
council of governors, the board of directors, and industry members. The hierarchy of
these three bodies is roughly equivalent to the directors, officers, and shareholders of a
corporation.
The five-member council of governors has the primary oversight role for the CPAB. It is
comprised of the chair of the CSA, the chair of the Ontario Securities Commission, the
chair of the Québec Autorité des Marchés Financiers, the federal superintendent of
financial institutions and the president and CEO of the CICA (CPAB Bylaws article 8.1).
The council of governors votes on bylaw amendments, and has the sole right to vote for
the appointment of the independent directors on the board and the sole right to appoint
the chair and the vice-chair of the board of directors (CPAB Bylaws article 8.2). The
council also has the power to remove the chair, vice-chair, and board members. The
council periodically reviews the effectiveness of the CPAB and is charged with taking
appropriate action to improve its effectiveness (“Structure” from CPAB web site,
http://www.cpab-ccrc.ca/dynamic.php? first=412a3e3729b6c&second=412b4d03b750d&lan-
guage=English).
The council of governors chooses the board of directors, which undertakes the bulk of
CPAB responsibilities (see specifically CPAB bylaws article 3.17). The board of directors
has been structured to contain a majority of members from outside the accounting pro-
fession and to provide a broad range of perspectives from all across Canada. It is com-
posed of eleven members, four of whom are from the accounting profession. A member
of the accounting profession is precluded from occupying the CPAB chair. Currently,
three of the four members from the accounting profession are required to be the CEOs of
the provincial Institutes of Chartered Accountants in Alberta and Ontario and the CEO
of the Ordre des comptables agréés du Québec (CPAB Bylaws article 3.2). Board mem-
bers are appointed for a term of up to three years and are eligible for reappointment up to
a total tenure of six years (“Structure” under CPAB web site, http://www.cpab-ccrc.ca /
dynamic.php?first=412a3e3729b6c&second=412b4d03b750d&language=English). All board
members are entitled to vote.
Because CPAB is incorporated as a not-for-profit corporation, it has members rather
than shareholders. In addition to the council of governors, its members include industry
members, with a representative coming from each of the ten provincial Institutes/Ordre
of Chartered Accountants (CPAB Bylaws article 9.1). The BC CGAs were recently
granted one seat as an industry member, increasing the total number of industry mem-
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bers to eleven. Industry members vote on bylaw amendments and appoint auditors of
the CPAB and the ex-officio directors.
Although not required to do so, CPAB has indicated that it will publicly report at least
annually on its activities. The CPAB also releases proposed rules on its web site and
solicits public comment. The CPAB has, on at least two occasions, modified and clarified
certain aspects of its proposed rules in response to communications received by the
CPAB, including a joint response of the seven largest accounting firms operating in Can-
ada (“Additions and Amendments of Rules” from CPAB web site, http://www.cpab-ccrc.ca/
dbdocs/421ce74da639e.pdf).
We see four significant differences between the CPAB and PCAOB governance struc-
tures. First, the PCAOB governance structure contains outside oversight in the
rulemaking process which is absent from the CPAB. PCAOB rules are subject to SEC
approval—and alteration if deemed deficient—whereas CPAB rules are only officially
subject to scrutiny from within the organization. In addition, the PCAOB is subject to
stringent oversight by the SEC. In contrast, the CPAB is monitored internally by its
council of governors. It is true that four of the five members of the council of governors
are provincial and federal government regulators, but the lines of accountability in rela-
tion to legislative oversight are much blurrier than with PCOAB. Unlike the PCAOB,
which must answer to the SEC, and thus, indirectly, to Congress, the CPAB is not sub-
ject to legislative supervision in the same way. Whether one views this as a good thing
depends on whether legislative oversight is likely to enhance the regulation of auditors.
Given the lack of expertise of the average legislator in this area, the value of legislative
oversight is open to serious question. In any event, if the CPAB falls down in performing
its responsibilities, the implicit threat of legislation to strip the body of those responsi-
bilities is there. The absence of an explicit threat of legislative intervention does not
seem to be a fundamental difference.
Second, the five-member PCAOB is considerably more compact than the 27-member
CPAB. In this regard it must be considered that with a board of this size, assuming a
diversity of opinion, the CPAB must rely more heavily on cooperation and compromise
than its American counterpart. The CPAB is structured to include perspectives from the
provinces, likely a practical necessity given Canada’s provincial system of securities reg-
ulation. A national or consolidated securities regulator in Canada would allow for a
smaller and more nimble board structure. This defect is ameliorated somewhat by the
more manageable size of the board of directors, which has responsibility for most of the
day-to-day functioning of the CPAB. However, consideration should be given to reduc-
ing the number of members.
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Third, new CPAB appointments either are made by people currently serving on the
CPAB, or are automatic ex-officio appointments based upon attaining positions in out-
side organizations. PCAOB members, in contrast, are appointed by the SEC. In this
regard, the CPAB appointment process appears to be less transparent than its American
counterpart.18
Last, on the spectrum of direct governmental regulation to self-regulation, the CPAB has
much greater industry involvement and participation. The council of governors includes
the President of the CICA, the Canadian self-regulatory body for chartered accountants,
suggesting that the CPAB—unlike the PCAOB—is still very much premised on self-reg-
ulation with some oversight or involvement of provincial securities regulators. The
national and provincial self-regulatory bodies for accountants are involved in CPAB in
ways that are absent in the structure of the PCAOB, where it is clear that the federal
securities regulator—the SEC—oversees the board. The CPAB contains a greater per-
centage of accountants on the board than the PCAOB. The PCAOB has two public
accountants, or 40 percent of its membership, while the CPAB is staffed by 16 accoun-
tants or approximately 59 percent of its membership—four on the board of directors,
one on the council of governors, and all 11 of the industry members.
Another cause for concern is that the representation of the accounting industry on CPAB
is currently limited to CAs. The CPAB’s mandate, however, is to oversee and inspect all
accounting firms that audit public companies, and, as noted above, CAs are no longer the
only group of accountants in Canada accredited to engage in public company auditing
(Public Accounting Act, 2004 (Ontario); International Accounting, 2005; The Accountant,
2005). The board has the authority to extend eligibility for membership as an Industry
Member to a wider group. At its November 2005 meeting, the board did in fact grant the
BC CGAs one industry member seat. The time is ripe to consider allowing proportionate
representation to CGAs and CMAs as industry members on CPAB. This would help
reduce the tendency for self-regulation to operate as a barrier to entry.
A board dominated by industry members will inevitably be perceived as being saddled
with an inherent conflict of interest. Accountant-representatives may block bylaw
changes that may be costly to the industry. Accountant-representatives may also be
somewhat less zealous in recommending enforcement against accountants in consider-
ation of the self-image of the profession19. Little mention is made, however, of the possi-
bility that the opposite might be true—that accountants might be tempted to treat their
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18 The transparency of the PCAOB’s appointment process was apparent from its inception with the
controversy over the initial selection of William Webster to be the new PCAOB chairman. Webster
withdrew before confirmation after his service on the audit committee of a company with serious
accounting problems came to light. The controversy over Webster’s appointment eventually led to
the resignation of then-SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt (Cummings et al., 2004).
competitors harshly in order to gain a competitive advantage. It is not clear which con-
cern should predominate.
Greater independence also must be traded off against expertise. Non-accountants will be
free of conflicts, but they will also lack the in-depth knowledge of the industry that can
only be acquired through actual practice as an accountant. Perhaps because of its greater
representation from the accounting industry, the CPAB appears to be more proactive
than the PCAOB in soliciting industry response and input. In this regard, the CPAB’s
self-regulatory orientation allows it to be more responsive to industry.20 It may be that
eliminating the conflict of interest will lead to sounder regulation, but where the line
should be drawn between eliminating conflict and preserving expertise is by no means
obvious.
Nonetheless, consideration should be given to revising the governance structure of the
CPAB to eliminate the voting rights of industry members. Consideration should also be
given to limiting the number of accountants on the board of directors. Neither of these
reforms would eliminate valuable input from the accounting industry, but they would
help alleviate concerns that self-regulation is being administered in the interests of the
accounting industry at the expense of the interests of investors. Some proportionate repre-
sentation from the CMAs and CGAs at the CPAB’s industry member level also warrants
further consideration, as it would allow input from other accounting bodies and also
address concerns that the system is being administered largely for the benefit of the CAs.
Independence
Recommendation 3:
Consideration should be given to heightening the independence requirements for
CPAB directors, many of whom fill influential roles in public companies that are
themselves subject to public audits.
PCAOB members are required to be full-time employees and may not be employed in
any other professional or business activity. In contrast, CPAB members serve part-time
and are permitted to concurrently engage in other positions. Many members of the
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19 On the efficiency of enforcement by self-regulatory organizations generally, see DeMarzo,
Fishman, and Hagerty, 2005.
20 Note that both the PCAOB and CPAB are meeting with relevant stakeholders to determine their
role in relation to overseeing foreign accounting firms that audit public companies in the US and
Canada respectively.
CPAB board of directors fill influential roles in public companies that are themselves
subject to public audits, and a reasonable argument could be made that these are activi-
ties that affect or reasonably create the appearance of affecting the board member’s inde-
pendence or objectivity.21
Post-Enron corporate governance reforms have relied on the notion that making outside
monitors more independent will reduce instances of misconduct or fraud in the capital
markets.22 The empirical evidence for this proposition is somewhat thin, but the intu-
ition behind it appeals to common sense. Independent monitors, however, may not be as
knowledgeable. In the context of a board overseeing accountants, it can be argued that
without substantial industry influence in an accounting oversight board that the out-
sider directors will end up relying on insider knowledge, effectively negating their influ-
ence. Ignorance is the countervailing threat to the lack of independence. Though the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has provided that the members of the PCAOB must be knowledge-
able, a lack of immediate connection to the burdens imposed by regulation relating to
accounting may impede board effectiveness.
The less stringent independence requirements for the CPAB must be assessed, however,
in light of the heavy participation of industry participants in its governance. If there were
fewer members of the accounting industry among the CPAB’s members, the presence of
members from public companies would be less of a problem in terms of creating the per-
ception of a lack of independence. Combining the predominance of accounting industry
representatives with public company executives unnecessarily raises doubt about the
rigor that the CPAB will bring to accounting regulation.
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21 Members of the PCAOB and CPAB are subject to very similar ethics codes. The codes are princi-
ples-based providing that when a situation is not covered by the code’s specific standards, board
members and staff shall nonetheless follow the spirit of the code. The codes seek to maintain the
highest standards of ethical conduct among board members and staff and to provide the public with
confidence in the objectivity of the board’s decisions by seeking to avoid both actual and perceived
conflicts of interest. However, considering that CPAB members are permitted to hold influential
roles on public companies, it would appear that the CPAB provisions are given a less stringent read-
ing than those of the PCAOB.
22 The push for greater independence has resulted in requiring a majority of independent directors on
public company boards in the US and instituting the best practice of a majority of independent
directors on public company boards in Canada. See, for example, Ontario Securities Commission
(OSC), 2004a, “National Instrument 58-101, Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices” and
OSC, 2004b, “National Policy 58-201.” This has also been the rationale for the requirement of
entirely independent audit committees in Canada and the US. See, for example, OSC, 2004c,
“Multi-Lateral Instrument 52-110 and Companion Policy” and relevant amendments.
Funding and potential conflict of interest
Recommendation 4:
Consideration should be given to amending the structure and source of CPAB’s
fees so as to minimize the direct influence of accounting firms that are inspected
by the board as well as to ensure a stable and guaranteed funding stream.
Whereas the fees charged by the PCAOB are subject to approval by the SEC and are over-
whelmingly collected from reporting issuers, the CPAB is funded directly by the
accounting firms that it regulates and its fees are not subject to any outside approval.
This was the practice in the US under the prior self-regulatory regime and it opened that
regime to criticism when the accounting industry threatened to withhold funding over a
dispute over the regulation of auditor independence (see Levitt, 2002, p. 127).
In passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress was anxious to preserve the independence
of the PCAOB from the accounting profession. In addition to the structural protections
of that independence discussed earlier, the PCAOB’s independence is further bolstered
by its funding sources. Registered public accounting firms are required to pay a small fee
to PCAOB, but the much more substantial source of funding is the annual accounting
support fees that public companies pay based on their market capitalization
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 109, 15 U.S.C. § 7219). The SEC must approve these fees
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 109(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7219(b)). For 2005, the board adopted a
$137.1 million budget of which $136.1 million was raised from annual accounting sup-
port fees (PCAOB, 2004). Thus, public companies now pay the overwhelming share of
the cost of regulating accountants, rather than accountants, who used to pay the cost of
the prior self-regulatory regime.
In contrast, the CPAB is funded directly by accounting firms that audit public companies
in Canada. The CPAB also collects two types of fees, but both come directly from
accounting firms. The one-time “Intent to Participate” fee is based on the number of cli-
ents the accounting firm audits annually (CPAB, 2003, p. 16).
The CPAB also collects annual participation fees, which are a prescribed percentage of
each firm’s revenue derived from auditing the financial statements of reporting issu-
ers.23 For 2004, the CPAB’s operating expenses were $6.4 million, which were served by
the collection of annual participation fees. It is difficult to compare this amount with that
collected by the PCAOB, given the much larger number of companies audited by the US
firms and the apparent wider scope of responsibilities imposed on the PCAOB.
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23 For 2004, the annual fee was set at 1.6 percent of the audit fees charged by a participating firm to its
reporting issuers (CPAB, 2004, p. 14).
Other features of the boards’ fee structures, however, can be compared. Both boards col-
lect higher fees from larger entities. The fee structure allocates costs in an equitable
manner. The higher fee charged to the larger issuer is considered equitable in that larger
issuers generally require a more complex audit (“Accounting Support Fees” on PCAOB
web site, http://www.pcaobus.org/Support_Fees/index.asp).
We are concerned, however, about the stability of the CPAB’s funding source. At a prac-
tical level, the difference between funding by issuers and funding by auditors probably is
not critical, given the contractual relationship between the issuers and the auditors, and
the fact that auditors can pass the cost of regulation along to their clients.
But the lack of guaranteed funding may matter. Currently, the CPAB enjoys the support of
the auditing industry as that industry endeavours to polish its reputation. But as the
self-regulatory experience in the US shows, the industry’s support can be withheld in a
confrontation. As well, the direct source of funding from the accounting profession also
creates a perception of a conflict of interest in the eyes of many observers. Industry fund-
ing should not be used as a tool for forcing submission by the CPAB in a dispute over the
proper scope of regulation. The PCAOB is protected from this threat because it gets the
bulk of its funding from public companies, rather than the accounting firms that it regu-
lates. A statute guaranteeing funding would greatly enhance the credibility of the
CPAB’s brand of self-regulation. Such a statute could require public firms to pay for the
cost of regulation (assessed based on market capitalization) or require the accounting
firms to pay the cost (based on the number and size of public companies audited). The
important point to be addressed would be ensuring that funding for the CPAB could not
be withheld in the event of a dispute.
Quality Control
Observation
The US has assigned much of the responsibility for setting auditing standards to
the PCAOB, or mandated these standards by statute, while the CICA continues to
exercise this authority. Further experience is needed to assess whether the greater
expense of the US approach is cost-justified.
In the US, standards for independent audits are governed by generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS), which were historically the responsibility of the Auditing Standards
Board (ASB), a committee of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA). The PCAOB, however, has now taken responsibility for those standards of
independent audits, as authorized by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley Act §
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101(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c)(2)).24 The PCAOB has also taken over the development
and implementation of quality control and ethics standards for auditors, as authorized
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.25 PCAOB rules include auditing and related professional
practice standards, forms, and the board’s Bylaws and Ethics Code.26 Currently, public
accounting firms involved in the preparation or issuance of audit reports are to follow
the ethics standards and independence standards as set out in the AICPA’s Code of Profes-
sional Conduct to the extent that those standards have not been superseded or amended by
PCAOB rules. The PCAOB adopted the AICPA’s standards as its own on an interim basis
(PCAOB Professional Standards, rules 3200T, 3300T, 3400T & 3500T), but going forward
the responsibility for revising those standards lies with the PCAOB (Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(3)(A)). The PCAOB has taken up the task, issuing stan-
dards on audits of internal controls, audit documentation (PCAOB, 2004b), and the
evaluation of efforts to correct weaknesses in internal controls (PCAOB, 2005a).
The CPAB, in contrast, has left the responsibility for setting auditing control standards
with the CICA. Accounting standards are set by the CICA’s Accounting Standards Board
(AcSB), which is overseen by the Accounting Standards Oversight Board (AcSOC).
Auditing and assurance standards in Canada are set by the CICA’s Auditing and Assur-
ance Standards Board (AASB), which is subject to the oversight of the Auditing and
Assurance Standards Oversight Council (AASOC). The CPAB has secured representa-
tion on the boards of the CICA that are responsible for accounting standards and audit
and assurance standards to provide comments and input from its perspective (CPAB,
2004). Recently, the AASB issued “General Standards of Quality Control for Firms Per-
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24 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizes, but does not require, the PCAOB to designate a professional
group of accountants to propose standards. The PCAOB, however, determined that developing
standards themselves with the assistance of qualified accountants would best serve the protection
of investors. The ASB is therefore no longer responsible for GAAS (Public Company Accountability
Oversight Board, 2003, p.10).
The principles governing the manner in which financial statements are produced remains under
the authority of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), an independent private sector
body that receives a majority of its funding from accounting firms. The CPAB has similarly left the
standards for financial statements with the CICA.
25 The act specifies that the board’s rules are required to include seven year retention of work papers,
peer review of audits, disclosure of auditors’ testing of issuers internal controls, monitoring of ethics
and independence, consultation within auditing firms, supervision, hiring, acceptance of engage-
ments, and internal inspection (Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103(a)(1&2), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1&2)).
26 In meeting its duties to establish auditing and ethical standards, the PCAOB seeks the counsel of a
Standing Advisory Group composed of industry people and allows the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board, the Government Accountability Office, the International Auditing and Assurance
Standards Board, and the Securities and Exchange Commission observer status with speaking
rights at all meetings of the Standing Advisory Group. This process allows the PCAOB to gather a
broad spectrum of viewpoints as it fashions various standards.
forming Assurance Engagements,” which the CPAB requires participating auditing
firms to follow.27
Similarly, the CPAB permits ethics standards for auditing firms to be set by the CICA
and the provincial institutes across the country (Smith, Caron, and Hunt, 2002, pp. 2-3).
Though the CPAB maintains discretion to impose additional ethical standards, it does
not appear to have used such authority. Thus, regulation of accounting in Canada has a
much greater self-regulatory content at present than it does in the US.
In sum, the creation of the PCAOB has led to a model of more direct government over-
sight of auditing and ethical standards, while CPAB continues to operate on a self-regu-
latory model following rules set by the CICA and provincial self-regulatory bodies. The
most obvious difference resulting thus far from these diverging approaches has been the
dramatic increase in the cost of audits for public companies in the US. This spike in
auditing costs, however, appears to be the result not of PCAOB rulemaking so much as
the statutory mandate imposed by Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.28 Section 404 of
that law requires that “each registered public accounting firm that prepares or issues the
audit report for the issuer” shall attest to the management’s assessment of the firm’s
system of internal controls for financial reporting (Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404(b), 15
U.S.C. § 7262(b)). Auditors are now required to not only certify the integrity of their cli-
ent’s financial statements, but also assess the mechanisms that their corporate clients
have adopted to generate the financial information that goes into those statements.
Smaller companies in particular have complained about the new costs imposed by this
requirement. Their complaints have been reinforced by recent work by Eldridge and
Kealey, who find an average increase in audit fees paid by a sample of 97 public compa-
nies from $3.5 million to $5.8 million (Eldridge and Kealey, 2005). They find that
increase is largely attributable to § 404 compliances costs and smaller companies bear a
disproportionately greater burden of those costs.29 The SEC recently delayed implemen-
tation of the § 404 requirements for smaller companies in response to a recommenda-
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27 The CPAB has required participating auditing firms to have a system of quality control that con-
forms to such standards by January 1, 2005 in respect of audits of reporting issuers, even though
AASB has established an effective date of December 1, 2005 (CPAB rule 204).
28 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also imposes a variety of additional requirements on auditors and public
companies to help promote audit quality. Auditors must adopt procedures to detect “illegal acts
that would have a direct and material effect” on financial statements and identify material related
party transactions (Exchange Act § 10A(a)(1) & (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(a)(1) & (2)). Auditors are
also required to evaluate the ability of the client to continue as a going concern through its next fis-
cal year (Exchange Act § 10A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(a)(3)). These duties were added to existing
responsibilities to report illegal acts to management and the audit committee or entire board of
directors (Exchange Act § 10A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)). A board of directors receiving such a
report must notify the SEC; if it fails to do so, the audit firm must provide notice to the SEC itself.
tion from the agency’s Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies (Bologna,
2005).
The increase in audit costs for US public companies may prove to be cost justified if it
results in significantly greater credibility for their financial statements, but it is still too
early in the process to determine if this will be the case. There is at least anecdotal evi-
dence that there may be some spillover effect, with audit costs rising in Canada as well,
despite the fact that Canada has not yet implemented more demanding internal control
requirements. Canadian securities regulators recently announced that they will delay
implementation of proposed Multi-Lateral Instrument 52-111 “Reporting on Internal
Controls over Financial Reporting”—the Canadian response to § 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act—as they monitor the criticisms over the US rule.
Inspection process
Recommendation 5
CPAB should consider undertaking inspections of smaller participating firms
which are currently inspected by provincial self-regulatory bodies. Otherwise, it
may be subject to criticism that it is not truly living up to its mandate of providing
independent inspections of all accounting firms that audit public companies.
The PCAOB’s inspection process is premised both upon its rules and upon the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The CPAB inspection process is premised only on its own rules.
Therefore, PCAOB inspections are subject to minimum requirements according to stat-
ute while the CPAB has greater flexibility in setting out the content of its inspections.
Both PCAOB and CPAB have created detailed methodologies for their inspections. Both
boards inspect and review selected audit and review engagements and evaluate the suffi-
ciency of the quality control system of the auditing firm.
With respect to the frequency of inspections, the PCAOB must conduct inspections
every year for firms auditing more than 100 issuers and at least every three years for
firms auditing fewer than 100 issuers (Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(b), 15 U.S.C. §
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29 William McDonough, chairman of the PCAOB, in a recent interview attempted to shift the blame
for this spike in costs to the auditors and their fear of litigation:
Auditors have to use judgment. They have a great deal of leeway. But in a litigious
society, there’s no question that some auditors may be protecting themselves by
doing work that all of us might think objectively is excessive. That I want to see elimi-
nated. The leadership of the firms agrees. But [auditors] have to be convinced that their
leaders will not be pleased by excessive work. (Business Week, 2005, p. 56)
7214(b)). In 2005, only eight firms were auditing over 100 reporting issuers and there
were 650 audit firms with under 100 reporting issuers (Gullapalli, 2005). In contrast,
CPAB conducts annual inspections of auditing firms that perform audits for 50 or more
reporting issuers per year, while firms engaging in 50 or fewer audits per year are subject
to a regular inspection at least once every three years (CPAB, rules 403-404). As of April
of 2004, only 12 firms in Canada were auditing more than 50 issuers (CPAB, 2003, p.
14). On its face, this suggests that the CPAB is taking on a greater burden of inspection
relative to the smaller Canadian capital market. However, the CPAB has allowed provin-
cial accounting self-regulatory bodies to continue to inspect smaller participating firms
on behalf of the CPAB and in accordance with CPAB rules and procedures (CPAB, 2003,
p. 4). The stated rationale is that provincial accounting self-regulatory bodies have devel-
oped a measure of expertise and accumulated knowledge that renders their oversight
more appropriate. We question, however, whether the CPAB is truly living up to its man-
date of providing independent inspections of all accounting firms that audit public compa-
nies. With inspections being conducted by different regulators, investors are left in the
dark about whether all auditing firms are being subjected to the same level of scrutiny.
Enforcement mechanisms
Recommendation 6
The CPAB’s enforcement effectiveness would be enhanced by statutory protection
providing immunity for its staff. Such immunity would allow them to pursue the
board’s mandate without fear of retaliation. In addition, the deterrent force of
sanctions available to the CPAB would be enhanced if it were provided with the
statutory authority to impose fines on accounting professionals who chose to
abandon the auditing of public companies rather than pay fines imposed by the
CPAB. Both PCAOB and CPAB have limited track records of sanctioning firms, so
we recommend that their relative performance in enforcing their rules be evalu-
ated at a later point when they both have longer track records.
Authority
The PCAOB has broad-ranging enforcement authority. The board is empowered to
investigate possible violations by registered accounting firms of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
the securities laws, and the PCAOB’s own rules (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 105(b)(1), 15
U.S.C. § 7215(b)(1)). In implementing this authority, the board is authorized to estab-
lish, by rule, fair procedures for investigating and disciplining registered public account-
ing firms and persons associated with these firms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 105(a), 15
U.S.C. § 7215(a)). In conducting its investigations, the PCAOB can compel registered
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firms and persons associated with those firms to testify and produce documents, includ-
ing audit work papers (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 105(b)(2)(A) & (B), 15 U.S.C. §
7214(b)(2)(A) and (B)). The rules also permit the board to seek information from other
persons, including clients of registered firms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 105(b)(2)(C) 15
U.S.C. § 7214(b)(2)(C)). Critically, the PCAOB can also call on the SEC to exercise its
wide-ranging subpoena authority to compel others to testify and produce documents
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 105(b)(2)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(2)(D)).
Firms that refuse to cooperate in the board’s investigation can have their registration
suspended or revoked (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 105(b)(3)(A)(ii), 15 U.S.C. §
7215(b)(3)(A)(ii)). Persons associated with the registered accounting firms can be sus-
pended or barred from associating with the firm; the firm can be required to fire a person
who does not cooperate (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 105(b)(3)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. §
7215(b)(3)(A)(i)). Lesser sanctions are also available for non-cooperation
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 105(b)(3)(A)(iii), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(3)(A)(iii)). The board
recently exercised its authority to sanction firms that fail to cooperate for the first time,
revoking the registration of a public accounting firm and barring its managing partner
for having falsified documents in an audit file in an effort to conceal a violation of the
independence rules (PCAOB, 2005b).
Inspections are conducted pursuant to CPAB rules. Inspectors are granted great leeway
in performing their inspections, as CPAB rules afford broad authority to “take such
steps, and perform such procedures, as the board determines are necessary or appropri-
ate” (CPAB, rule 402). Firms subject to inspection are required to provide all documents
requested. Furthermore, all persons are required to provide information either by oral
interview, written response, or otherwise (CPAB, rule 406).
Comparing the scope of the two board’s authority, one principal difference is that the
enforcement powers of the PCAOB come from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (and the PCAOB
rules authorized by that act) while CPAB enforcement authority is derived from the
CPAB rules. Given that CPAB enforcement powers can be changed by the procedures for
amending CPAB rules as opposed to the procedure for amending a statute, one could
argue that PCAOB enforcement powers are more stable and further insulated from the
pressure of interest groups. On the other hand, the insulation enjoyed by the PCAOB
also creates concerns that the temptation of regulators to regulate excessively will not be
countered by resistance from the regulated industry.
Another more substantial difference is the PCAOB’s ability to call on the SEC’s sub-
poena authority. The CPAB’s lack of subpoena power means that it must depend entirely
on the cooperation of the audit firms that it regulates. Even for the work papers in the
possession of auditors, the CPAB may be denied access if the papers are deemed to con-
tain confidential information about reporting issuers. The broad statutory authorization
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enjoyed by the PCAOB means that it has access to all of the information needed for a
complete inspection and/or investigation. Moreover, it can demand documents from
third parties as needed.
Consequences
According to the PCAOB rules, if the board determines that there was a potential mal-
feasance on the part of the participating audit firm, it is to inform the SEC and the appro-
priate state regulatory authority, and it is also entitled to investigate (PCAOB, rule
4004). Firms subject to a report shall be provided with a draft of the inspection report.
The firm is entitled to respond to the draft within 30 days indicating for which portions
of the report they request confidentiality (Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(f), 15 U.S.C. §
7214(f)). After receiving and reviewing any response, the PCAOB can adopt the report
as its final report or continue to revise the draft as necessary (PCAOB, rule 4007). Once
the final report is issued, it shall be released to the relevant firm and appropriate state
regulatory authority (PCAOB, rule 4008). If a final report identifies quality control
defects, the firm may demonstrate to the director of the Division of Registration and
Inspections that it has remedied the defects within twelve months. If the defects are suc-
cessfully remedied, they will not be made public (PCAOB, rule 4009). However, at all
times the board is empowered to publish information from its inspections as the PCAOB
deems appropriate, so long as the firm itself is not identified (PCAOB, rule 4010).
When PCAOB staff detect violations, the party being inspected is entitled to notification
of the specific charges to which they are subject, and a record shall be kept of the pro-
ceeding (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 105(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(1)). The board will pro-
vide an opportunity for a hearing (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 105(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
7215(c)(2)), and in appropriate cases, impose sanctions designed to deter a possible
recurrence and to enhance the quality and reliability of future audits.30
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30 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 105(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4).
The board is empowered to impose a wide range of sanctions, including:
 money penalties of up to $100,000 for associated persons and $2 million for firms;
 censure;
 required education or training; and
 other penalties provided for in the board’s rules.
More stringent penalties can be imposed for intentional or knowing misconduct or repeated negli-
gence:
 temporary or permanent suspensions of registration of firms or bars of their associated
persons;
 limits on the operations and activities of the firm and its associated persons; and
 money penalties of up to $750,000 for associated persons and $15 million for firms.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 105(c)(4) & (5), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4) & (5).
The CPAB process for producing inspection reports is similar. Pursuant to the informa-
tion gleaned from the inspection, the board produces a draft inspection report noting any
significant problems and remedial recommendations. The report also states whether the
board intends to impose any requirements, restrictions, or sanctions on the firm. The
firm is then required to submit a response to the draft report within 30 days indicating
whether it accepts the report and reasons for its acceptance or lack thereof (CPAB, rule
409). The CPAB and the firm may continue in correspondence in the manner contem-
plated above, though with only 15 days response time for the firm, until the CPAB
adopts a version of the report as the final report. At this point, the board may take such
action as it deems appropriate (CPAB, rule 410). If a final inspection report identifies
significant weaknesses or makes recommendations for improvement of systems of qual-
ity control, the firm is given 180 days from the issuance of the final report in which to
show they have implemented or remedied these deficiencies to the satisfaction of the
board (CPAB, rule 414). If the board does not remedy the problems identified in the time
given, it may publicize this fact after notifying the firm. The firm is entitled to appeal
such a finding (CPAB, rule 416).
If violations are found in the course of an inspection, the CPAB is empowered to order an
investigation of said event or order requirements, restrictions, or sanctions (CPAB, rule
418). Potential requirements include requiring a firm to expand its professional develop-
ment program, to craft and implement certain policies, or to engage an independent
monitor to report on the firm’s compliance with professional standards. Examples of
restrictions include temporary or permanent limitations on firm activities or the activi-
ties of a person. In severe cases, the CPAB may declare a firm to no longer be in good
standing with the CPAB, thereby precluding that firm from conducting audits of public
companies in Canada (CPAB Rule 601). Though these coercive mechanisms are avail-
able, the CEO has stated that, “our intent is to work with the participating firms in a
cooperative non-adversarial way to bring about audit quality improvements where they
are appropriate” (CPAB, 2003, p. 10).
The PCAOB, as a quasi-governmental entity, is subject to more extensive procedural
requirements than the CPAB. The PCAOB can only sanction a registered accounting
firm or associated person after a hearing and the release of a report. These procedural
safeguards, while undoubtedly increasing the accuracy of the PCAOB’s determinations,
create the risk that the auditing firm will tie the PCAOB up in legal manoeuvring. This
difference, however, may not be all that substantial, as the CPAB’s rules also allow for
the possibility of a hearing prior to the imposition of a requirement, restriction, or sanc-
tion proposed by the board (see CPAB, rule 701).
Both the PCAOB and the CPAB are given wide disciplinary authority. Both boards
employ the threat of publicizing the misconduct of the offending firm in order to coerce
them into meeting the recommendations supplied in the private report that was pro-
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duced based on the inspection of the respective board. The PCAOB gives firms 12
months to meet their recommendations while the CPAB only gives 180 days. CPAB and
PCAOB sanctions are quite similar in range with both boards capable of precluding a
firm from conducting audits of public companies in severe cases and otherwise imposing
fines and remedial measures for lesser offences. Statutory authorization could also pro-
vide the CPAB with authority to impose fines on accounting professionals who chose to
abandon the auditing of public companies rather than pay the fines imposed by the
CPAB. This would bolster the deterrent force of the sanctions available to the CPAB.
The PCAOB’s statutory authorization also means that the PCAOB members and staff
clearly enjoy the immunity from legal actions afforded to regulators. The CPAB’s lack of
similar immunity raises questions about how aggressively it will perform its duties. So
far, the PCAOB has only sanctioned one firm, and that was for obstructing its inspection
(see PCAOB, 2005b). The CPAB has a similarly limited track record, having only
recently imposed its first sanctions, limiting three firms from accepting new audit clients
until they have implemented CPAB recommendations, and limiting the partners eligible
to do quality control reviews at a fourth firm (CPAB, 2005, p. 7). A longer track record is
needed before we can assess the two bodies’ relative performance in enforcing their
rules.
Transparency and predictability of activities
Recommendation 7
The CPAB’s and PCAOB’s activities should be more transparent to the public, so
as to enhance their accountability. This recommendation must be tempered
against the litigation risk faced by inspected audit firms, so we also recommend
making the reports inadmissible in court.
Both the CPAB and PCAOB provide copies of their final inspection report to the partici-
pating audit firm. The PCAOB is required to provide a report to professional regulatory
authorities and the SEC, while the CPAB may provide a copy of the report to the profes-
sional regulatory authority with jurisdiction over the firm in question. Neither organiza-
tion will provide other third parties with copies of the report. Both boards adhere to the
principle that only those portions of the report that have not been dealt with to the satis-
faction of the board shall be publicized. Both the CPAB and PCAOB have further discre-
tion to release information gleaned from their inspections, but the boards do not publish
information that would identify the relevant accounting firm unless the information was
previously and lawfully made public.
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The PCAOB issued “Limited Inspection Reports” in August 2004 for the Big Four firms
(PCAOB, 2004c), and the full inspection reports are now available on the PCAOB’s web
site (see http://www.pcaobus.org/inspections). Similarly, in October 2004, the CPAB issued
a public report on the results of its initial quality inspections of the four largest account-
ing firms, and outlined the scope of the inspections and the recommendations made
without identifying the firms inspected by name. It found that there “were no systemic
problems with the quality of the firms’ audits, but there was room for improvement”
(CPAB, 2004.) In its second inspection report released in August 2005, the CPAB indi-
cated that the recommendations from its October 2004 inspection report were being
implemented by the relevant firms. At the release of its second inspection report, CPAB
has now inspected firms auditing more than 80 percent of Canada’s public companies
(more than 90 percent by market capitalization) (CPAB, 2005, p. 3) and identified five
principal areas of concern:
1. Inadequate implementation of revised independence rules, including internal
controls to detect independence problems;
2. Lack of effective internal quality controls, with partners operating autonomously
without firm oversight;
3. Accepting or retaining unacceptably risky clients, with the CPAB noting “instances
where firms retained clients despite clear evidence form the audit work that the integrity of
management was in significant doubt”;
4. Failure to evaluate staff for audit quality, with “little evidence of effective counselling
and evaluation of staff members”;
5. Inadequate, “ad hoc” training (CPAB, 2005, pp. 3, 7-8).
In the four most problematic cases, the CPAB placed requirements on the firm’s prac-
tice, restricting it from accepting new clients until the CPAB’s recommendations were
implemented, or on their personnel, restricting certain partners from performing quality
control reviews (CPAB, 2005, p. 7). Notably, the CPAB’s concerns were mainly raised by
its inspections of smaller audit firms as larger firms were reported to have put in place
sophisticated quality control systems (CPAB, 2005, pp. 6-7).
Although the two boards have made public reports related to the conclusions of their
inspections, it is questionable how useful that information is to relevant stakeholders in
assessing the effectiveness of the oversight boards. We believe that greater publicity of
findings of material weaknesses in audit procedures would provide more of a deterrent
for audit firms to do a good job with their audits. Reputation is critical to auditors. The
loss of reputation is an important deterrent against both negligence and affirmative
Fraser Institute Digital Publication
February 2006
The Regulation of Public Auditing in Canada and the United States 35
wrongdoing, particularly in a business like accounting, in which firms are effectively
“renting” their reputations to their clients. A public censure from the accounting regula-
tors would seriously compromise an audit firm’s reputation.
Particularly in the US, however, providing the public with information to assess the ade-
quacy and thoroughness of the auditor’s work has to be balanced against the audit firms’
litigation concerns. Public airing of weaknesses in their audit procedures could provide
fodder for litigation. Similarly, making public the documents available to the PCAOB or
CPAB would be very tempting to current and prospective private litigants.
The CPAB also seems to be concerned about its own litigation risk, apart from the litiga-
tion faced by accounting firms subject to their inspections. Unlike public authorities
(including the PCAOB), CPAB directors, officers, and staff are not protected for actions
taken in good faith in carrying out the board’s mandate (CPAB, 2004, p. 3), such that
their release of inspection deficiencies of member firms (or omission to do so) may also
result in potential liability of the board, officers, and staff to member audit firms, report-
ing issuers, investors, and other stakeholders.
Accordingly, we believe that greater transparency for PCAOB and CPAB reports should
be accompanied by a privilege making them inadmissible in court actions, whether the
defendants in such actions are the auditing firms or the boards themselves. We should
not let litigation concerns dilute the informational value provided by the PCAOB and
CPAB reports. The boards need to be able to disseminate their findings candidly and
promptly, so that market participants can weigh those findings in their assessments of
audit quality. Prompt dissemination also holds regulators to account through the release
of detailed and timely information.
Conclusion
Striking the appropriate balance among market-based, self-regulatory, and legal mecha-
nisms for promoting audit quality is a delicate task. The CPAB and the PCAOB are both
charged with overseeing the auditors of public companies in an effort to enhance the
quality of audits for those companies. The two boards diverge primarily on the division
of regulatory effort between self-regulation and governmental regulation, with the
PCAOB being much more of a governmental regulator.
The PCAOB, a quasi-governmental agency created by federal legislation, is not depend-
ent upon the accounting industry for direction or funding. The PCAOB has both consid-
erable independence from the accounting industry and a reliable source of funding,
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primarily from public companies. The PCAOB is also insulated from accounting industry
influence by SEC oversight of its functions. This insulation carries a cost, however, in
terms of pushing the PCAOB toward intrusive regulation to avoid antagonizing the SEC
and its legislative overseers.
As a self-regulator, the CPAB is vulnerable to charges of capture by the auditing indus-
try. The CPAB currently has a substantial complement of accountants among its mem-
bers and is funded by the auditing firms that it regulates. This dependence on the
accounting industry could result in actual or perceived conflicts of interest that could be
detrimental to the integrity of the institution and more generally to investor confidence
in the capital markets. The CPAB could protect itself from charges of industry capture by
making itself more independent.
Greater independence for the CPAB could be achieved by eliminating the voting power
of its industry members over bylaw changes, making those members more of an advisory
body. Greater independence would also be promoted by limiting the number of accoun-
tants serving on the board of directors. This change would put non-accountants more
firmly in control of the CPAB’s day-to-day operations. Both of these changes would have
the collateral benefit of making the CPAB’s decision-making bodies more compact. Nei-
ther of these reforms would eliminate valuable input from the accounting industry, but
they would help alleviate concerns that self-regulation was being administered in the
interests of the accounting industry at the expense of the interests of investors.
The independence of the CPAB is also called into question by the fact that many mem-
bers of the CPAB board of directors also fill influential roles in public companies that are
themselves subject to public audits. These activities could create the appearance of
affecting the board member’s independence or objectivity. Combining the predomi-
nance of accounting industry representatives on CPAB with public company executives
raises doubt about the rigor that the CPAB will bring to accounting regulation. As such,
consideration should be given to heightening the independence requirements for CPAB
board of directors.
The CPAB’s current funding is also a concern. CPAB is funded directly by accounting
firms, whereas PCAOB is funded by public companies. Consideration should be given to
changing the funding structure so that accounting firms do not directly control the finan-
cial viability of the CPAB and also to avoid any perceived conflict. This would require leg-
islation to provide the CPAB with a guaranteed source of funding, whether it continue to
be directly from the accounting profession or alternatively from public companies.
A more secure source of funding might allow the CPAB to expand the scope of its inspec-
tions to cover all firms auditing public companies. The CPAB’s lack of statutory authori-
zation, most notably its lack of subpoena power, also has potential adverse
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consequences for its enforcement authority. The broad statutory authorization that the
PCAOB enjoys means that it has access to all of the information needed for a complete
inspection and/or investigation. Statutory authorization could also provide the CPAB
with authority to impose fines on accounting professionals who chose to abandon the
auditing of public companies rather than pay the fines imposed by the CPAB. Finally, the
PCAOB members and staff clearly enjoy immunity for their acts as regulators. The
CPAB’s lack of similar immunity raises questions about how aggressively it will perform
its duties. The CPAB’s enforcement effectiveness would be enhanced by statutory pro-
tection providing immunity for staff, which would allow them to pursue the board’s
mandate without fear of retaliatory litigation.
Both the CPAB’s and PCAOB’s activities should be made more transparent to the public,
so as to enhance their accountability. This recommendation must be tempered against
the litigation risk faced by inspected audit firms, so we also recommend making the
reports inadmissible in court. Litigation concerns should not dilute the informational
value provided by the PCAOB and CPAB reports. The boards need to be able to dissemi-
nate their findings candidly and promptly, so that market participants can weigh those
findings in their assessments of audit quality.
Providing statutory authority for CPAB will be challenging in the current context of
securities regulation by provincial authorities in Canada. Statutory authorization also
carries the risk for the CPAB of a potential for a governmental takeover of its regulatory
function, as has happened in the US with the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The
statute was a strong signal of reform, but it has proved to be expensive for US public
companies, not to mention lucrative for the auditing profession. Moreover, the regula-
tory burden imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has fallen disproportionately on the
smallest issuers, creating the risk that some of these firms will “go dark,” removing their
securities from public trading, and that other firms will remain closely-held rather than
pursuing growth through an initial public offering.
Self-regulation promises to be more carefully tailored to the needs of Canadian compa-
nies than direct government regulation, but the self-regulators need the tools to ensure
the credibility of that self-regulation. Appropriately tailored legislation could give the
CPAB greater power and independence than it now has, but it should not require the
CPAB to take over the standards for audits currently set by the CICA. An even greater
worry is that legislation validating the CPAB’s role might tempt legislators to experi-
ment themselves in the field of setting auditing standards, a task for which most of them
are very poorly equipped. Any statute legitimizing the CPAB would need to be narrowly
drawn to bolster its efficacy and credibility, without putting the regulation of auditors
directly under government control.
Fraser Institute Digital Publication
February 2006
The Regulation of Public Auditing in Canada and the United States 38
References
Accountant, The (2005). “Country Survey—Canada: Institutes Full of Bright Ideas” (Feb-
ruary 28).
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (2002). The Enron Crisis: The AICPA,
the Profession and the Public Interest: A Brief History of Self-Regulation.
Benston, George J. (2003). “The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting
Before and After Enron.” Emory Law Journal 52: 1325-1345.
Bologna, Michael (2005). “SEC’s Small Company Panel Recommends Relief From Sec-
tion 404 Filing Requirements.” Securities Regulation & Law Report (August 15).
Buckstein, Jeff (2005). “Washington Trip Fuels Accounting Family Feud.” The Bottom
Line, Vol. 21:2 (February).
BusinessWeek (2005). “Mr. McDonough, You Have The Floor: The Accounting Watchdog
on Sarbanes-Oxley, Excessive Auditing, and Investor Trust.” (August 1): 56.
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA). “Auditing and Assurance Stan-
dards Board.” Digital document available at: http://www.cica.ca/index.cfm/ci_id/
19621/la_id/1.htm
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA). “Auditing and Assurance Stan-
dards—Oversight.” Digital document available at: http://www.cica.ca/index.cfm/
ci_id/204/la_id/1.htm.
Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) (2003). Annual Report. Digital document
available at: http://www.cpab-ccrc.ca/dbdocs/412b54efd22bc.pdf.
Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) (2004). Annual Report. Digital document
available at: http://www.cpab-ccrc.ca/dbdocs/428dea09d8cb7.pdf.
Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) (2005). Second Public Report on Quality
Inspections of Public Accounting Firms subject to the Canadian Public Accountability Board
Oversight Program (August 18).
Chaney, Paul R. and Kirk L. Philipich (2002). “Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit
Failure.” Journal of Accounting Research 40.
Cummings, Jeanne et al. (2004). “Rapid Exit: SEC’s Pitt Resigns Amid Controversy
Over Webster Job.” Wall Street Journal (November 6): A4.
DeMarzo, Peter M., Michael J. Fishman, and Kathleen M. Hagerty (2005). “Self-Regula-
tion and Government Oversight.” Review of Economic Studies 72: 687.
Eisenberg, Theodore and Jonathan R. Macey (2004). “Was Arthur Andersen Different?
An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients. Jour-
nal of Empirical Legal Studies 1 (July).
Eldridge, Susan W. and Burch T. Kealey (2005). SOX Costs: Auditor Attestation under Sec-
tion 404. Working Paper. Omaha: University of Nebraska (June).
Financial Accounting Standards Board (2005). Facts About FASB. Digital document avail-
able at www.fasb.org.
Fraser Institute Digital Publication
February 2006
The Regulation of Public Auditing in Canada and the United States 39
Fung, Simon and Ferdinancd A. Gul (2005). Evidence of Audit Quality Difference Among Big
Five Auditors. Working Paper, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
Gullapalli, Diya (2005). “Oversight Board Gets Red Marks For Pickiness Among Audit
Firms.” Wall Street Journal (April 14): C15.
Government of Canada (2004). An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Capital Markets Fraud
and Evidence Gathering). Third Session, Thirty-Seventh Parliament. (Bill C-13):
52-53.
International Accounting (2004). “No ‘Systemic Problems’ Found with Canadian Big Four
Audits” (October 13).
International Accounting (2005). “Oversight is Here to Stay” (March 16).
Levitt, Arthur (2002). Take on the Street. Pantheon Books/Random House.
Nagy, Donna M. (2005). “Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and
its Public/Private Status.” Notre Dame Law Review 80: 975, 989-990 (2005).
Ontario Securities Commission (2004a). “National Instrument 58-101, Disclosure of
Corporate Governance Practices.” Corporate Governance Guidelines. Digital document
available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20041029_
58-101_disc-corp-gov-prac.jsp
Ontario Securities Commission (2004b). “National Policy 58-201.” Corporate Governance
Guidelines. Digital document available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/
Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20041029_58-201_corp-gov-guidelines.jsp
Ontario Securities Commission (2004c). “Multi-Lateral Instrument 52-110 and Com-
panion Policy,” Corporate Governance Guidelines. Digital document available at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20040326_52-110-
audit-comm.jsp
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (2003). Annual Report. Digital
document available at http://www.pcaobus.org/About_Us/Annual_Reports/2004.pdf.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (2004). “Board Approves
Revised 2005 Budget.” News Release (December 30). Digital document available at
http://www.pcaobus.org/news_and_events/news/2004/12-30.aspx.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (2004b). “Auditing Standard
no. 3: Audit Documentation” (June 9).
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (2004c). “Statement Concern-
ing the Issuance of Inspection Reports.” Release No. 104-2004-001 (August 26).
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (2005a). “Auditing Standard
no. 4: Reporting on the Elimination of a Material Weakness” (July 26).
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (2005b). “Board Revokes
Firm’s Registration, Disciplines Three Accountants for Failure to Cooperate.”
News release (May 24). Digital document available at http://www.pcaobus.org/
News_and_Events/News/2005/05-24.aspx.
Pritchard, A.C. (2005). The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement? Notre Dame Law Review 80.
Fraser Institute Digital Publication
February 2006
The Regulation of Public Auditing in Canada and the United States 40
Puri, Poonam and Stephanie Ben-Ishai (2004). “Proportionate Liability under the CBCA
in the Context of Recent Corporate Governance Reform: Canadian Auditors in the
Wrong Place at the Wrong Time?” In Poonam Puri and Jeff Larsen. Corporate Gover-
nance and Securities Regulation in the 21st Century. Toronto; Lexis-Nexis, Butterworths.
Securities and Exchange Commission (2002). Framework for Enhancing the Quality of
Financial Information Through Improvements of Oversight of the Auditing Process. Securi-
ties Act Release 8109 (June 26).
Seligman, Joel (1985). “The SEC and Accounting: A Historical Perspective.” Journal of
Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 7: 241-254.
Smith, David (President and CEO of the CICA), Gerard Caron (Ordre des compatables
agrees du Quebec), and Brian Hunt (President and CEO, ICAO) (2002). Statement to
the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce (June 12).
Wise Persons’ Committee to Review the Structure of Securities Regulation in Canada
(2003). It’s Time (December). Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada. Digital docu-
ment available at http://www.wise-averties.ca/main_en.html.
About the authors
Adam C. Pritchard is Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School and Poonam
Puri is Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. The
research assistance of Randy Slepchik is gratefully acknowledged.
Fraser Institute Digital Publication
February 2006
The Regulation of Public Auditing in Canada and the United States 41
About this publication
Fraser Institute Digital Publications are published from time to time by The Fraser Institute
(Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada) to provide, in a format easily accessible online,
timely and comprehensive studies of current issues in economics and public policy.
Distribution
These publications are available from http://www.fraserinstitute.ca in Portable Document
Format (PDF) and can be read with Adobe Acrobat® or with Adobe Reader®, which is
available free of charge from Adobe Systems Inc. To download Adobe Reader, go to this
link: http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep.html with your browser. We encour-
age you to install the most recent version.
Disclaimer
The authors of this publication have worked independently and opinions expressed by
them are, therefore, their own, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the support-
ers or the trustees of The Fraser Institute.
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 by The Fraser Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this publication
may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the
case of brief passages quoted in critical articles and reviews.
ISSN
1714–6739
Date of issue
February 2006
Editing, design and production
Lindsey Thomas Martin and Kristin McCahon
Fraser Institute Digital Publication
February 2006
The Regulation of Public Auditing in Canada and the United States 42
About The Fraser Institute
Our vision is a free and prosperous world where individuals benefit from greater choice,
competitive markets, and personal responsibility. Our mission is to measure, study, and
communicate the impact of competitive markets and government interventions on the
welfare of individuals.
Founded in 1974, we are an independent research and educational organization with
offices in Vancouver, Calgary, and Toronto, and international partners in over 70 coun-
tries. Our work is financed by tax-deductible contributions from thousands of individu-
als, organizations, and foundations. In order to protect its independence, the Institute
does not accept grants from government or contracts for research.
Fraser Institute mailing address
The Fraser Institute, 4th Floor, 1770 Burrard St., Vancouver, BC, Canada V6J 3G7
Development
For information about becoming a Fraser Institute supporter, please contact the Devel-
opment Department via e-mail: development@fraserinstitute.ca; via telephone:
604.688.0221 ext. 586; via fax: 604.688.8539. In Calgary, please contact us via e-mail:
barrym@fraserinstitute.ca; via telephone: 403.216.7175 or, toll-free 1.866.716.7175; via
fax: 403.234.9010.
Media
For media enquiries, please contact Suzanne Walters, Director of Communications, via
e-mail: suzannew@fraserinstitute.ca; or via telephone: 604.714.4582.
Ordering publications
For information about ordering The Fraser Institute’s printed publications, please con-
tact the book sales coordinator via e-mail: sales@fraserinstitute.ca; via telephone:
604.688.0221 ext. 580 or, toll free, 1.800.665.3558 ext. 580; or via fax: 604.688.8539.
Fraser Institute Digital Publication
February 2006
The Regulation of Public Auditing in Canada and the United States 43
